Meanwhile Back in Bolivia

Evo Morales’ stunningly decisive victory in the 2005 national elections came with a promise to increase the economic and political power of Bolivia’s Native American majority. His triumph reprised that of Hamas on the West Bank in forcing the United States to deal with an unfriendly but democratically-elected regime. The Bush administration has grudgingly conceded Morales’ popularity, but it remains unwilling to recognize his legitimacy. By refusing to appreciate that Morales and his allies represent a profound desire to change the status quo through peaceful means, the United States clings to a policy with little support in Latin America and one that will continue to erode U.S. influence in the region.

Since his election, Morales has been confronted by a loose coalition of national and regional politicians opposed to his platform. Despite ongoing negotiations, intermittently mediated by Catholic prelates and representatives of the Organization of American States, positions have only hardened in the past two years. What began as a legitimate dispute over how Morales and his allies would govern escalated into the pattern of street demonstrations, roadblocks, and building takeovers characteristic of Bolivian politics. In September Morales and his adversaries seemed willing to take the country over one of the Andean nation’s many cliffs. Violence spiked, culminating with the massacre of 18 peasants at Cobija, in the Bolivian Amazon. And, in the midst of the upheaval, Morales declared U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg persona non grata.

Bolivia’s relations with the United States are colored by its traditional reliance on large amounts of economic assistance and our ambassadors’ proclivity for inflammatory remarks made to the local media. Morales has chosen to employ his own brand of verbal pyrotechnics which fires up his base but are often quoted in the North American press as evidence of his instability. The appointment of a career diplomat as ambassador was initially viewed in Bolivia as the beginning of a new relationship with the United States. However, Goldberg quickly proved himself a vociferous advocate for coca eradication and became embroiled in the struggle between Morales and his political opponents. In August of 2007 Bolivian officials accused the United States of channeling money to conservative opponents of the government, and Morales himself later threatened “radical actions” against ambassadors who meddle in his country’s internal affairs. Goldberg’s departure was triggered by his subsequent meeting with prominent members of the opposition, giving the impression of U.S. support.

At the end of October, Bolivia began to walk back from the brink. Violence subsided as did the political impasse. A new constitution, which embodies many of the issues central to Morales and his allies is before the Bolivian legislature. And demands for greater regional autonomy, especially control of petroleum and natural gas revenues, will be decided within the framework of political discourse rather than through street violence. But it was an alliance of South American nations, notably excluding the United States, that defused the crisis.

The Bush administration’s relationship with Bolivia is based almost solely on coca eradication. So when the State Department’s Annual Report on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries, released on September 15, found that Bolivia “failed demonstrably” to enact counter narcotics strategies in the year 2007, it threatened to suspend several aid programs. Bolivians were quick to disagree with the report, pointing out that the annual increase of coca production in their country was smaller than that of Peru and much smaller than Colombia’s, neither of which was sanctioned. Eleven days later, President Bush requested that Congress suspend Bolivia’s preferential tariffs under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. As the New York Times noted in its editorial of October 6, these decertifications seem more a reaction to the expulsion of Ambassador Goldberg than part of a coherent foreign policy.

While the United States threatened sanctions, a recently-constituted regional organization undertook constructive action. UNASUR, the Union of South American Nations, met in emergency session four days after the Cobija massacre. On the same day that the State Department released its Annual Report, seven heads of state and representatives of four other South American nations quickly hammered out a nine-point plan that strongly supports Bolivia’s democratically elected government and urges all parties to enter immediate negotiation. UNASUR’s unequivocal backing of Morales, its refusal to recognize any of his opponents as legitimate representatives of the state, and its insistence on the territorial integrity of Bolivia broke a two-year old stalemate.

While it is still too early to declare the Bolivian political crisis resolved, the quick actions of UNASUR offer Bolivians a chance to resolve their problems through political means. U.S. policy in the region, tying economic aid to drug eradication, is narrow in its approach and punitive in its interpretation. It has failed to offer democratically-elected governments the means to foster domestic peace and stability, outcomes that serve the interests of all concerned. It is time for a new administration in Washington to offer a new approach to Latin America.